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‘It’s the Economy, Comrade!’ Parties and 
Voters in the 2007 Russian Duma Election 
 
IAN MCALLISTER & STEPHEN WHITE 
 
ELECTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AT REGULAR INTERVALS to the lower 
house of the Russian parliament, the State Duma. Successive changes in the electoral 
law have, however, allowed the central authorities to establish an increasing degree of 
influence over the outcome. The success of the United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) party 
in December 2007, on the evidence of a national post-election survey, is largely to be 
explained by its association with President Putin, and his own association with a rapid 
rate of economic advance. In turn, this suggests that the future of the party and of the 
dominant position it has been able to establish are heavily dependent on the 
continuing success of the Kremlin in maintaining a rate of economic advance that 
ordinary Russians find satisfactory. 
 Elections with a limited choice of candidate had already begun to take place in the 
last years of the USSR. But the first multiparty as well as multicandidate elections 
were held in 1993, to a newly established Federal Assembly; and since then elections 
have regularly taken place on the same basis to the lower house of the new Assembly, 
the State Duma (the upper house, the Federation Council, was directly elected the 
same year but has since then been formed in other ways). These first fully competitive 
elections established a parliament that was to hold office for just two years, to 1995; 
from this time onwards elections have been held every four years, in accordance with 
the provisions of the 1993 constitution. The Duma’s predecessor, the Russian 
Supreme Soviet, had been strongly oppositional, and a breakdown in relations with 
the Kremlin led directly to its suspension and then suppression in September–October 
1993, followed by the adoption of a constitution in which the powers of the president 
were considerably enhanced. Initially, oppositional and independent candidates had 
considerable success in elections to the new parliament; but a Kremlin-sponsored 
party, Unity (Edinstvo), came a close second in the party-list vote in 1999, and in 
2003 its direct successor, United Russia, won so comprehensively that it was able to 
establish a ‘constitutional’ or two-thirds majority. 
 Formally speaking, competitive elections to a national legislature are one of the 
distinguishing features of a democracy, and international observers were initially very 
positive about the way in which procedures of this kind had become established in a 
former communist country within a relatively short period of time. The OSCE’s 
report 
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on the 1999 Duma election was perhaps the high point of this relentless optimism; it 
hailed the election as further evidence of ‘progress in consolidating representative 
democracy’, with parties and blocs that were allowed to compete on an ‘equal basis’ 
within a legal framework that was ‘consistent with commonly recognised democratic 
principles’. Its report on the 2003 Duma election was much more critical, complaining 
that it had ‘failed to meet a number of OSCE commitments for democratic elections’ 
including a clear separation between the competing parties and the state itself, and 
equal treatment in the media.1 International observers were rarely concerned about the 
casting of ballot papers on polling day; but they were much less satisfied by the way 
in which the media gave a disproportionate share of their attention to the parties and 
candidates that were favoured by the Kremlin, and by the way in which 
‘administrative resource’ or the power of office was used to give them an additional 
advantage. Criticisms of this kind made the presence of international monitors of any 
kind a matter of some controversy during the period that led up to the election of 
December 2007, and in the end the OSCE decided it would be inappropriate to send a 
mission on the terms that had been offered. 
 All kinds of other issues came under sharp focus during the campaign. There was no 
doubt, according to the polls, that United Russia would win an overwhelming 
majority. But in order to establish its authority, a respectable turnout was essential, 
and certainly higher than the 56% that had voted in December 2003. Beyond this, the 
result would have direct implications for the presidential contest that was due to take 
place the following spring. United Russia had associated itself directly with ‘Putin’s 
Plan’, and the Russian President, though not a party member, had agreed to head its 
list of candidates. If there was a strong vote ‘for Putin’, or otherwise, it would have 
considerable significance for the presidential succession, with Putin himself unable to 
stand for a further term. In particular, it was important to the Kremlin that his 
favoured candidate—as it turned out, Dmitri Medvedev—should be able to acquire 
the kind of authority that would be represented by a heavy vote for the presidential 
party. Beyond this again, these were the first elections under a new electoral system 
that ended the single-member constituencies that had returned half the candidates in 
earlier contests, leaving all the seats to be allocated on the basis of a national party-list 
vote. How would Russia’s voters behave within this different and highly structured 
environment, while at the same time responding to the range of factors that shape 
electoral choices in other countries? 
 
The electoral environment 
 
Formally speaking, Russian elections are governed by a ‘framework law’ that covers 
elections at all levels of the system and also the conduct of referendums. The law that 
currently prevails was adopted in 2002, and had been amended 20 times by the time 
 
1 The OSCE’s monitoring missions are organised by its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights, based in Warsaw; its reports on Russian and other elections may be consulted at 
www.osce.org/odihr (last accessed 19 April 2008). Other monitoring organisations, such as the 
European Institute for the Media, had begun to take a sceptical view much earlier than this (its reports 
may be consulted at www.eim.org, last accessed 19 April 2008); one of the present authors was a 
member of their monitoring team in December 1999 and again at the presidential election the following 
March. 
 
of the December 2007 election.2 In addition, Duma elections are governed by a more 
specific law ‘on the election of deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of 
the Russian Federation’, of which an entirely new version has been adopted at each 
election since 1995. The current version of the law was adopted in May 2005 in a 
context that had been defined by the president’s reaction to a hostage-taking crisis at 
Beslan, in the northern Caucasus, the previous September. Putin called for 
government structures to be strengthened in the face of this new threat: one response 
was to end the direct election of Russia’s governors, another was to introduce a fully 
proportional system of elections to the Duma.3 Putin promised a bill that would 
establish a system of this kind in the ‘near future’; it was, indeed, already under 
discussion, and had been openly advocated by the chairman of the Central Electoral 
Commission.4
The 2005 law represented a considerable departure from the Duma election laws that 
had preceded it (O vyborakh 2005). In particular, it allocated all the Duma’s 450 seats 
to the national party-list contest, and abolished the single-member constituency 
elections that had returned half the deputies in all previous Duma elections. This 
meant that there would no longer be independents, who had normally taken the largest 
or, in 2003, second-largest share of the seats available; indeed even party-sponsored 
candidates in the single-member constituencies had been obliged to give their main 
attention to local circumstances if they were to compete successfully for the support 
they needed.5 In future, only registered political parties would be permitted to 
nominate candidates (art. 7:2), and parties themselves found it more difficult to 
register as the 2001 law on political parties was amended in December 2004 so as to 
increase the minimum number of members that was necessary to do so. (It had 
originally been 10,000; the amended law required no fewer than 50,000 members, 
distributed nationwide.)6 Nor could smaller parties any longer form ‘blocs’ with other 
groupings and in this way secure the right to put forward candidates of their own. 
 The new law changed the electoral system in other ways that also advantaged the 
political parties in general, and the larger (mostly pro-Kremlin) parties in particular. 
Under the new law, parties that were represented in the outgoing Duma would have 
the right to nominate a list of candidates without further formalities (art. 39:2). Other 
parties would be obliged to collect the signatures of at least 200,000 electors in order 
to do so (art. 39:3), or else pay an electoral deposit (art. 39:5), which was set at 15% 
of a party’s maximum permitted expenditure (art. 66:3); this was defined elsewhere in 
the law as 400 million rubles (art. 64:3), which meant that the deposit was 60 million 
 
2 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 24, item 2253, 12 June 2002. This and other items of 
electoral legislation may be consulted in their current form on the Central Electoral Commission 
website www.cikrf.ru (last accessed 19 April 2008). Several Russian-language studies provide helpful 
context: see for instance Gasanov and Prudnikov (2007), Golovin (2007), Sanaev (2007), Skosarenko 
(2007), Ivanchenko and Lyubarev (2007), and Aranovsky et al. (2007). 
3 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 14 September 2004, pp. 1, 3. 
4 Kommersant, 12 August 2006, p. 1. 
5 Our 2005 survey, fielded in March and April (n=2,000), found that public opinion was broadly in 
favour of a fully proportional system (39%), but 27% were against it and a substantial 35% undecided. 
However, more or less the opposite was true when respondents were asked which system gave them 
greater influence over the conduct of government: 24% thought it was the party-list system, but 33% 
thought it was the single-member constituencies. A survey conducted by the Public Opinion 
Foundation found a still stronger preference for single-member constituencies when it came to 
‘upholding citizens’ interests’: 46% preferred them in such circumstances, as against just 7% who 
favoured party lists (Izvestiya, 1 September 2004, p. 3). 
6 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 52, item 5272, 20 December 2004. 
 
rubles (about $2.5 million). If more than 5% of the signatures were declared invalid 
(previously 25%), or if the number of signatures fell below the minimum once invalid 
ones had been excluded, the party would not be registered (art. 43:19, 20). The 
deposit itself would not be returned if a party failed to achieve at least 4% (previously 
3%) of the vote (art. 66:9, 10), and parties that failed to achieve at least 3% 
(previously 2%) of the vote would be required to return the value of the free 
broadcasting and press coverage they had received (art. 69:3)—a further disincentive 
for smaller and less well-supported contenders. 
 Other changes were similarly designed to strengthen the position of the larger 
parties, which were generally those that could most easily be controlled by the federal 
authorities. One of these changes was an increase in the threshold, from 5% to 7% 
(this was a change for which provision had already been made in the previous election 
law, adopted in December 2002). The election would, however, be invalid if no single 
list of candidates reached 7% of the vote, or if only a single list of candidates did so, 
or if all the lists of candidates together accounted for no more than 60% of the total 
(art. 82:4, 7). Equally, if the party lists that reached the threshold accounted among 
them for no more than 60% of the vote, less successful parties would be included in 
the allocation of seats until this total was attained; and if a single party won more than 
60% of the vote and no other party reached the threshold, the next most successful 
party would be included in the allocation of seats (art. 82:8, 9). Seats themselves were 
to be allocated by the Hare method, according to provisions that are set out in detail in 
article 83 of the law. 
 The 2005 law had been amended eight times by the time the Duma election took 
place, on Sunday 2 December 2007. In almost every case the changes were designed 
to strengthen still further the advantages that were already enjoyed by the Kremlin 
and the larger parties. One of the first of these amendments, in July 2006,7 removed 
the right that Russians had enjoyed since before the 1993 election to vote ‘against all’ 
candidates and parties, and at all elections including local and presidential ones. This 
had been an increasingly popular option, accounting for 4.7% of the party-list and 
12.9% of the constituency vote in the 2003 election (indeed it ‘won’ three of the 
individual seats), and there was considerable public opposition to its removal,8
although international monitors had criticised this somewhat unusual practice and it 
arguably took votes away that might otherwise have allowed smaller parties to reach 
the threshold.9
Then in December 2006 an amendment to the framework law removed the minimum 
turnout requirement, which had been set at 20% with a higher requirement 
permissible for elections at the national and regional level.10 The Duma election law 
had specified a modest 25% in 2005 and all its previous versions. But the presidential 
election law had specified 50%, and there was clearly some possibility that the 
selection of an unpopular or little-known candidate in place of Vladimir Putin would 
depress turnout to such an extent in the March 2008 election, in which he would no 
longer be able to stand, that the whole exercise would be invalidated (turnout at the 
 
7 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 29, item 3125, 12 July 2006. 
8 According to a Levada Centre poll, for instance, 60% opposed the change before it took place, and 
only 18% supported it; subsequently, 65% supported the restoration of the facility and only 25% were 
opposed (‘Vybory 2007’, based on a survey of 1,600, fieldwork 13-16 April 2007, available at: 
www.levada.ru/press/2007050801.print.html, accessed 19 April 2008; similarly Fedorov 2007, pp. 
235-36; Izvestiya, 6 September 2007, p. 3). 
9 For a review see McAllister and White (2008). 
10Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 50, item 5303, 5 December 2006. 
 
previous election, in March 2004, had been just over 64%). In the spring of 2007 a 
further amendment to the Duma election law carried this change into practical effect 
when it removed the minimum turnout requirement entirely, and made the same 
change in the presidential election law.11 Again, this was a change that reflected 
international practice, but it had the effect of withdrawing yet another ‘weapon of the 
weak’—in this case, the ability to invalidate the election itself by abstaining in 
sufficiently large numbers.  
 In spite of this series of changes, Russian elections retained a number of distinctive 
features. First of all, candidates on the various party lists were not obliged to be 
members of that party (art. 7:3 of the Duma law), although they could not be a 
member of another party and the proportion that were not party members could not 
exceed 50% of the total (art. 36:6). In previous elections, candidates elected on a 
particular party list had not even been obliged to take a seat in the corresponding party 
fraction in the new Duma; in December 2003, for instance, United Russia had won 
223 seats, but it had already accumulated 300 by the time the new Duma held its first 
meeting as independents and members of other party lists were persuaded to transfer 
their loyalties in what amounted to an extended auction.12 This practice was ended 
when the law on the status of the deputy was amended on 21 July 2005, obliging all 
the deputies elected on a particular list of candidates to take their place within that 
party’s Duma fraction and providing for their expulsion from the Duma altogether if 
they chose to withdraw from it.13 This approximated to the system known elsewhere 
as the ‘imperative mandate’, and placed even more powers in the hands of party 
leaders who could in turn be more readily influenced by the Kremlin. 
 Nor did successful candidates have to take their seats in the legislature. Under the 
law, they had five days to indicate their preference following the official 
announcement of the result, failing which their seat would be transferred to another 
candidate from the same party (art. 85:1, 2). In the event, all the parties lost deputies: 
three in the case of the Liberal Democrats (Liberal’no-demokraticheskaya partiya 
Rossii), four in the case of the Communists (KPRF, Kommunisticheskaya Partiya 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii), and nine in the case of Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya). 
United Russia, however, had a dramatic outflow of 113, which was more than a third 
of the seats it had been awarded, including the Russian President himself as well as all 
but one of the governors that had lent their authority to its list of candidates.14 In 
practice, this meant that a series of ministers and governors took their place at the 
head of the various candidate lists of the ‘party of power’, then systematically 
declined to take up their seats after they had exercised their influence on its behalf. 
Understandably, they became known as ‘locomotives’. An amendment to the law in 
April 2007 introduced an even more advantageous arrangement by which successful 
candidates who declined their seats could take them up at a later stage under 
appropriate circumstances—in effect, a ‘sleeping mandate’ (art. 89). 
 
11 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 18, item 2118, 26 April 2007. 
12 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 30 December 2003, p. 1. 
13 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 30, item 3104, 21 July 2005. 
14 Vestnik Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 19, 2007, pp. 28-38. Three of the 
newly promoted deputies had themselves been replaced a week later (Vestnik Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi 
komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 19, 2007, pp. 38-39, 51, 53). The governor, Anatolii Lisitsyn of 
Yaroslavl’ region, was the first who had ever chosen to become a deputy rather than disavow his seat; 
the Kremlin was thought to have made him an offer he was unable to refuse (Izvestiya, 14 December 
2007, p. 2). 
 
The entire electoral exercise is regulated by the Central Electoral Commission 
(CEC), and its counterparts at lower levels. As originally constituted under the 2002 
framework law, the CEC was nominated on an equal basis by the Duma, the 
Federation Council and the president, and each of its 15 members was required to 
have a law degree (art. 21:4, 5). In January 2007, however, this requirement was 
amended so that each of its members would in future be required to have no more 
than a ‘higher professional education’.15 Two months later the long-serving CEC 
chairman Alexander Veshnyakov was obliged to resign,16 and shortly afterwards he 
was replaced by Vladimir Churov, a bearded atmospheric physicist who was the 
nominee of the Liberal Democratic Party but more to the point, a long-standing friend 
of the Russian President.17 The election was presided over by Vladislav Surkov, 
deputy head of the presidential administration, who offered the retiring Veshnyakov 
the Order for Services to the Fatherland (Second Class). Churov, it emerged, had not 
been a member of the Liberal Democrats for some years, and was merely a member of 
Zhirinovsky’s faction in the Duma. Commentators saw his appointment as ‘just 
another service rendered to the Kremlin by the Liberal Democrats. Naming a member 
of United Russia to head the CEC would have been going too far’.18 
The contenders 
 
Under the terms of the Duma law, a new election is called by the president between 
90 and 110 days in advance of the date on which it is due, and takes place on the first 
Sunday of the month in which the powers of the outgoing Duma expire (art. 6:2). 
Putin signed a decree on 2 September calling the election for the following 2 
December 2007, and the formal process of nomination began. Under the law, parties 
are required to hold conferences within 30 days of the announcement of an election to 
approve their lists of candidates, which may consist of no more than 600 individuals, 
divided wholly or partly into regional groups; each of these must in turn correspond to 
a region, or group of regions, or part of a region with between 650,000 and three 
million electors, and they must collectively encompass the entire national territory 
(art. 36:1, 3, 9, 10, 19). The list of candidates is then presented, together with the 
signatures or deposit that may be necessary for its support, to the Central Electoral 
Commission not more than 75 or less than 45 days before the election is due to take 
place (art. 42:4). The CEC in its turn has 10 days to check the documentation and 
decide whether or not to register the list of candidates (art. 44:1). 
 The Central Electoral Commission completed its deliberations on 28 October. Of the 
14 parties that had sought registration, three were entitled to do so without further 
formality as they were represented in the outgoing Duma and had the right, under the 
election law (art. 37:2), to put forward a list of candidates without presenting either 
signatures or a deposit: United Russia, the Communist Party, and the Liberal 
Democratic Party (Rodina had also been represented in the outgoing Duma, but it was 
not a party and was not in any case contesting the new election under its own 
auspices). Of the remaining parties, the Union of Right Forces (URF), Yabloko,
Patriots of Russia and Just Russia registered by paying the electoral deposit, and the 
 
15 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 6, item 681, 30 January 2007. 
16 Izvestiya, 14 March 2007, p. 3. 
17 Izvestiya, 28 March 2007, p. 1. 
18 Vremya novostei, 28 March 2007, pp. 1–2. 
 
others sought to do so by collecting signatures. Three were found to have included an 
excessive number of invalid signatures (the Greens, the People’s Union and the Peace 
and Unity Party), but the Agrarian Party, Civic Force, the Democratic Party of Russia 
and the Party of Social Justice19 were able to satisfy the various requirements of the 
law and were duly included among the 11 parties that eventually appeared on the 
ballot paper, with a total of 4,684 candidates on their federal and regional lists.20 
In principle, the election law provides equal opportunities for all the parties. 
Elaborate arrangements are made, for instance, for an appropriate distribution of party 
election broadcasts, and free advertising space in the printed press. Parties are 
‘guaranteed equal access to the mass media’ (art. 10:4), and those who hold office in 
state or public organisations are not allowed to make use of the advantages that are 
afforded by the position they occupy, such as the use of office staff, telephones, 
premises or transport (art. 46:1, 4); if they wish to engage in campaigning themselves 
they must be temporarily relieved of their duties (art. 46:2). Electoral materials 
themselves are supposed to be ‘objective’ and consistent with the ‘equality of rights 
of the political parties’ (art. 51:2), and may not impugn the ‘honour, dignity or 
business reputation’ of any of the candidates or parties (art. 62:6). A draw takes place 
to allocate positions on the ballot paper (art. 73:4; the Agrarian Party had the modest 
advantage of first place). But the campaign was robbed of much of its significance by 
the refusal of the dominant and most strongly pro-Kremlin party, United Russia, to 
take part in studio discussions with the other parties, although it did make use of its 
free broadcasting and newspaper allocations. It could of course rely on the fact that its 
candidates—including the president himself—were assured of coverage when they 
acted in their official capacity, and it had the backing of the state machine. 
 In spite of these provisions, there was evidently some scepticism among the Russian 
electorate that the vote would be free and fair. Substantial numbers, for instance, 
expected the results would be falsified by local or regional electoral commissions 
(39%), and many others thought there would be some bribery of electors by the state 
authorities (33%) or by those who opposed them (30%). These and similar abuses, it 
was thought, would have a ‘significant or very significant influence’ on the outcome 
(49% agreed, 23% disagreed). And only 40% thought the newly elected Duma would 
‘reflect the wishes of the people of Russia’; 45% took the opposite view.21Interviewed 
in mid-November by the Levada Centre, almost half thought the election would be 
‘only an imitation of a contest, as the distribution of seats would be determined not by 
the results of the voting but by the decisions of the authorities’; rather fewer (34%) 
thought it would be a genuine election, and another 18% were undecided. But all the 
same, about two-thirds (63%) intended to vote, somewhat more than had been 
intending to vote at the same stage four years earlier. The entire electoral process, it 
appeared, had acquired a ‘routine character: the approval of what exists’ (Vybory v 
Gosdumu 2007). 
 The survey evidence also made clear that United Russia would be the dominant 
presence in the new Duma. United Russia, in the words of party leader Boris Gryzlov, 
 
19 The party names in Russian are as follows: Union of Right Forces (Soyuz Pravykh Sil), Patriots of 
Russia (Patrioty Rossii), the Greens (Rossiiskaya ekologicheskaya partiya ‘Zelenye’), the People’s 
Union (Narodnyi soyuz), the Peace and Unity Party (Partiya mira i soglasiya), the Agrarian Party 
(Agrarnaya partiya Rossii), Civic Force (Grazhdanskaya Sila), the Democratic Party of Russia 
(Demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii), and the Party of Social Justice (Partiya sotsial’noi spravedlivosti). 
20 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 29 October 2007, p. 1; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 30 October 2007, p. 2. 
21 ‘Vybory 2007’, see footnote 8. 
 
was the ‘Party of Putin’, and it represented the election as a ‘national referendum in 
support of Vladimir Putin’.22 Its programme, in turn, was ‘Putin’s Plan’. Only 6%, 
according to the survey evidence, actually knew what the Plan was, but no less than 
65% approved of it.23 The party itself produced an elaborate compendium of Putin’s 
eight addresses to the Federal Assembly, with a subject index for the convenience of 
activists, under the title of ‘President Putin’s Plan’ (Pavlovsky 2007). Speaking to 
supporters in the summer of 2007, Gryzlov identified five of its key features. The first 
was the preservation of Russia as a ‘unique and great civilisation’. The second was 
the ‘building of a competitive economy’, and the third was a ‘new quality of life’. 
Fourth was the establishment of the ‘institutions of a civil society’, and fifth was the 
‘further development of Russia as a sovereign democracy’24—the term, avoided by 
Putin himself, that party ideologists had developed as their attempt to provide a larger 
purpose for his historical mission. Putin himself, during the campaign, accepted that 
United Russia was far from an ‘ideal political structure’, without ‘stable ideological 
principles’, and with a membership list that was full of careerists.25 But neither did he 
conceal that he had been the ‘initiator of its establishment’.26 
There was accordingly a certain logic when at the first part of its 8th congress the 
Russian President agreed to head the United Russia party list, although he was not a 
member of the party itself.27 He also announced that he might consider becoming 
prime minister if there was a president who was a ‘decent, capable, effective and 
modern-thinking person with whom it would be possible to work’.28 Given this 
position at the head of the list of the single dominant party, it was not surprising that 
Putin’s occasional addresses set the tone of the entire campaign. A rally for his 
supporters at Luzhniki stadium in Moscow was particularly notable. It was the first 
speech in which Putin directly called for Russian voters to support United Russia; but 
it also contained a sharp attack on the integrity of his political opponents, accusing 
them of ‘slinking around Western embassies’ for their support.29 Here and in other 
speeches, including an address to the diplomatic corps shortly before the vote, Putin 
repeatedly insisted that Russia would not allow its political choices to be ‘corrected 
from outside’,30 and official spokesmen made clear that they had in mind the way in 
which (in their view) the electoral process in other post-Soviet republics had been 
used to set off a series of spurious ‘coloured revolutions’ that had actually been 
intended to convert them into Western clients. 
 All the registered parties, under the law, are obliged to publish an election manifesto 
in at least one national newspaper at least 20 days before the election takes place (art. 
55:12). United Russia called its manifesto ‘Putin’s Plan: a worthy future for a great 
country’.31 Russia, they claimed, had been following a strategy that was ensuring that 
it became one of the ‘world centres of political and economic influence, cultural and 
 
22 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 17 October 2007, p. 1. 
23 Daily Telegraph, 12 November 2007, p. 19. 
24 Daily Telegraph, 12 November 2007, pp. 10–11 
25 Izvestiya, 14 November 2007, pp. 1–2. 
26 Izvestiya, 2 October 2007, p. 2. 
27 Izvestiya, 2 October 2007, p. 1; he was adopted the following day as the single name on the party’s 
federal list. 
28 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 3 October 2007, p. 1. 
29 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 November 2007, pp. 2–3. 
30 Kommersant, 29 November 2007, p. 4. 
31 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9 November 2007, p. 14. 
 
moral attraction’, a strategy that guaranteed a ‘new quality of life for all the country’s 
citizens’. This was ‘Putin’s Plan’, and during the coming four years it would mean the 
‘further development of Russia as a unique civilisation’, a more competitive 
economy, and the full implementation of the ‘national projects’ that Putin had first set 
out in a speech to the government in September 2005, and which included health, 
education, housing and agriculture. There would also be ‘significant increases’ in pay 
and pensions, support for the institutions of civil society, and a further strengthening 
of Russian sovereignty and defensive capacity so that it would have a ‘worthy place in 
a multipolar world’. Putin, personally, was described as Russia’s ‘national leader’, 
and the party itself as his ‘political support’. 
 Of the other 10 parties that were registered as participants, only two could be 
regarded as serious competitors although scarcely as an electoral challenge. The 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, led by Gennadii Zyuganov since its 
refoundation in 1993, had contested all previous Duma elections and won seats in all 
of them, although it had been conspicuously less successful in 2003 (with just 12.6% 
of the list vote) than in the earlier contests. The party had traditionally appealed to 
leftwing opinion, and to those who were nostalgic for the social guarantees of the 
Soviet era (and were often older than other voters), but it also appealed to a 
‘national-patriotic’ constituency, and in this respect its position did not necessarily 
differ from that of the regime itself. The list was headed by party leader Zyuganov, 
Nobel laureate Zhores Alferov, and the party’s candidate in the 2004 presidential 
election, Nikolai Kharitonov. Zyuganov explained that the party would seek to 
destroy the ‘three-way alliance of bureaucrats, oligarchs and bandits’ that was running 
the country and to safeguard the interests of ordinary people through a more 
‘equitable distribution of the national wealth’ and by ‘dismantling the vertical chain of 
command’. The longer-term aim was a new policy of industrialising the country on 
the basis of twenty-first century technology in which the party would ‘continue the 
fight to regain its image as the chief and only champion of the Russian people’.32 
The party’s election manifesto, ‘Power for the Working People!’, took a gloomy 
view of the position in which Russia now found itself. But it insisted that a 
‘breakthrough to the future [was] possible’, and that other countries—‘socialist 
China’, India, Brazil, ‘fraternal Belarus’, Cuba and Vietnam, Venezuela, Bolivia and 
other countries—had shown the way. The crucial element was an independent 
politics, and a ‘refusal to live under the dictate of the imperialists’. The party’s ‘seven 
steps to a worthy future’ included the nationalisation of natural resources and strategic 
industries, increases in pay and pensions, and state-led modernisation of industry, 
agriculture and transport. There would be moves towards ‘people’s power’, including 
more honest elections and a reduction in the state bureaucracy, and all officials and 
deputies would be required to make annual declarations of their income and property. 
There would be a new emphasis on domestic security, including the restoration of the 
death penalty for especially serious crimes; and in foreign affairs, an emphasis on the 
restoration of relations among the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, Belarus 
‘and possibly Kazakhstan’. In addition to this, there would be a return to free, high-
quality education and health care, and a new constitution would be put to a popular 
vote that would restore power to the soviets of people’s deputies.33 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (Liberal’no-
demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii) appealed to a rather different constituency, more 
 
32 Vremya novostei, 24 September 2007, p. 2. 
33 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9 November 2007, p. 12. 
 
strongly nationalist and right wing. Its appeal had normally owed a great deal to 
Zhirinovsky himself, who had led the party since its foundation in 1990 and was an 
outspoken, unpredictable but charismatic campaigner. It had been represented in all 
previous Dumas, but had always enjoyed much less success in the single-member 
constituencies than in the party-list contest. Its list included Andrei Lugovoi, who was 
wanted in the United Kingdom in connection with the murder of former KGB agent 
Alexander Litvinenko, as well as Zhirinovsky and his son Igor’ Lebedev.34 The LDPR 
manifesto represented the party as the country’s ‘constructive opposition’. So far, 
only officials and oligarchs had gained from 16 years of economic reform. The LDPR 
called for oil and gas resources to be taken back from the oligarchs, and used to raise 
living standards. There should be a progressive system of income tax, in which the 
rich would pay more. The revenue this generated should be invested in better pensions 
and housing, and all salaries should be ‘significantly increased’. Extra help should be 
given to small businesses, to the armed forces, and to the health service. There should 
be a seven-hour working day, with Wednesdays an additional day off. The federation 
itself should be simplified, with just 50 territories. And there should be an ‘active 
multivector foreign policy’, with its primary emphasis on Russia’s southern 
neighbours and the possibility of the voluntary reintegration of the former Soviet 
republics into a new ‘Russian Empire’.35 
Of the other parties, Just Russia was a combination of Rodina (a broadly 
‘leftpatriotic’ party that had fought the previous election as a Kremlin-friendly 
opposition), together with the Pensioners’ Party (Rossiiskaya partiya pensionerov)
and the Russian Party of Life (Rossiiskaya partiya zhizni). Its central values, 
explained party leader and speaker of the upper house Sergei Mironov, were ‘social 
justice and the wellbeing of citizens’. But social justice could only be achieved in a 
society that protected the weak as well as allowing the strong their opportunities. This 
was ‘New Socialism’, or in other words ‘our own, Russian path to a just and united 
society and a social state’. A socialist perspective for Russia, explained the manifesto, 
involved a socially oriented economy, a strong state that was under democratic 
control, and a dynamically developing society. It meant policies that reflected the 
interests of the majority of the population, a fair distribution of incomes, protection 
from poverty and official arbitrariness, social security, and accessible health and 
educational systems. Just Russia also believed that taxation should be more 
progressive, with special duties on luxuries, and that salaries should be raised for all 
who worked in the state sector. Not surprisingly, given the party’s origins, there was a 
considerable emphasis on pensions, which should represent at least 65% of previous 
rates of pay; there was no reference at all to the institutions of government 
themselves, or to defence and foreign affairs.36 
A further constituency was represented by the two parties that most directly  
represented liberal-democratic values, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces. 
Yabloko, led since its foundation in 1993 by economist Grigorii Yavlinsky, had won 
no party-list seats in 2003 but took four of the single-member constituencies. Its 
preelection programme offered ‘seven steps to equality of opportunities’. First of all, 
there would have to be political reforms, including genuinely free elections, a real 
separation of powers, and independent courts. Government should be separated at the 
same time from the conduct of business, and priority given to the development of a 
 
34 Kommersant, 18 September 2007, p. 3. 
35 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 8 November 2007, p. 12. 
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‘stratum of owners’, particularly in smaller and medium-sized enterprises. There 
should also be a one-off tax on the superprofits that had been earned by a very few 
during the corrupt auctions of state property during the 1990s, and trade unions should 
be established that could properly defend the rights of ordinary workers. Monopolies 
should be more closely regulated, ‘beginning with Gazprom’, and there should be 
higher levels of investment in education and public health. A distinctive element was 
Yabloko’s emphasis on the environment, based on the principle that ‘the polluter 
pays’ and organised through a restored ministry of ecology with greater powers.37 The 
list was headed by Yavlinsky, with former human rights commissioner Sergei 
Kovalev in second place.38 
The Union of Right Forces was more overtly pro-market and pro-Western; it had 
been founded in 1999, and had won three single-member seats in the election to the 
outgoing Duma. Despite many attempts to do so, the two ‘democratic’ parties had 
never been able to merge or even agree a common list of parliamentary candidates, 
and it was not thought likely that the modest levels of support they attracted 
individually would allow either of them to reach the 7% threshold. The URF list was 
headed by party leader Nikita Belykh, with former party leader Boris Nemtsov in 
second place. Its manifesto called for a ‘liberal breakthrough’ instead of a ‘new 
‘‘stagnation’’’.39 In the first place this meant returning to the Duma in sufficient 
numbers to form a party fraction, and then proposing a long-term strategy of reform 
that would reduce the country’s dependence on the export of energy while at the same 
time reducing the level of state ownership and distributing assets more widely. There 
would be legislative changes that would strengthen the rights of individual owners; 
the rights of the subjects of the federation would be properly respected; there would 
be equal opportunities for all, and targeted support for those whose circumstances 
required it; and political reforms. The dissolution of the USSR, in the party’s view, 
had been positive on balance, and the reforms of the 1990s broadly successful. 
Notwithstanding Russia’s particular characteristics, there was no realistic alternative 
to the ‘political and economic institutions and the same social security as in the West’. 
 Entering the campaign, United Russia had an overwhelmingly dominant position, 
and its rating in the opinion polls was very close to the share of the votes that were 
cast on 2 December (Figure 1). The adoption of Putin as the single name on the 
party’s federal list produced some improvement—6% in a week according to one 
estimate40—but left it well below the president’s own approval rating. It had 
enormous advantages of other kinds, including its disproportionate access to the mass 
media (particularly television) and its ability to use the resources of the state itself. 
According to independent monitors, United Russia received from 57 to 62% of all 
prime-time political news coverage between 1 October and 22 November, much more 
than any of its competitors. Another exercise, which counted the number of times 
parties were mentioned, found that United Russia was twice as likely to be cited as the 
Communist Party, its nearest competitor.41 The same tendencies were apparent in 
other monitoring exercises: United Russia was the most likely to be shown taking the 
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initiative, it was the most likely to be mentioned in a positive way, and its 
spokespersons were the most likely to be reported in their own words.42 
In spite of the requirements of the law there was no shortage of evidence that the 
state itself was directly involved in the campaign, advantaging United Russia and 
disadvantaging its various opponents. In Nizhnii Novgorod, for instance, foremen 
went round the workforce at the city’s massive vehicle factory telling them to vote for 
 
Source: Adapted from www.levada.ru, last accessed 8 April 2008. Figures show the distribution of 
voting preferences among those who said they intended to vote, in rounded percentages (the November 
figures are for 23–27 November, beyond which survey forecasts could not be reported), and the vote 
itself on 2 December. CPRF=Communist Party of the Russian Federation; LDPR=Liberal-Democratic 
Party of Russia; URF=Union of Right Forces. 
 
FIGURE 1. PARTY PREFERENCES AMONG INTENDING VOTERS, JANUARY–NOVEMBER 
2007 
 
Putin’s party, and to phone in after they had left the polling station: ‘Names would be 
taken, defiance punished’. Some, leaving nothing to chance, were told to obtain 
absentee certificates and fill them out in front of their immediate superiors. The 
factory director, a senior United Russia official, was able to report that nearly 80% of 
the workforce had voted; one of the factory workers became a deputy himself. 
Elsewhere in the city, teachers handed out leaflets promoting ‘Putin’s Plan’ and told 
the children to lobby their parents. Some were ‘threatened with bad grades if they 
failed to attend ‘‘children’s referendums’’’; at other schools, parents were simply 
‘ordered to attend mandatory meetings with representatives of United Russia’. At 
university level, students were told that unless they voted for the ruling party they 
would be evicted from their dorms. Evidently very concerned, they went out and 
‘voted ‘‘like a line of soldiers’’’ (Levy 2008). 
 
42 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 November 2007, p. 3. 
 
Those who tried to assist any of the other parties found it rather more difficult to do 
so. Volunteers from the Union of Right Forces, for instance, ‘received hundreds of 
calls at all hours, warning them to stop working for their candidates. Otherwise [they] 
would be hurt’. And there was ‘black propaganda’, such as the distribution of ‘tens of 
thousands of leaflets’ suggesting that the URF ‘ardently favoured gay rights and 
employed canvassers with AIDS’ (neither was true). The leaflets often included the 
name and phone number of a leader of the party’s regional list of candidates; some 
had condoms attached, and announced offers to send supporters to a gay pride event 
in Amsterdam. Businesses cut off donations after threats from government officials, 
and the party was refused advertising space on everything from billboards to 
newspapers and local television. When Boris Nemtsov, who had been the regional 
governor, tried to campaign, nobody would rent him a hall. In November, the party’s 
headquarters was ransacked and spray-painted with profanities and graffiti that 
proclaimed it the ‘Party of Gays’. A few weeks before the election, the party’s leading 
official in the region gave up and renounced the party at a press conference that was 
heavily covered on state television. ‘You begin to think: you have a family, you have 
a business, and you may value this significantly more than a political career’, 
explained one local activist.43 
There were similar difficulties when the openly oppositional ‘Other Russia’ coalition 
sought to communicate its views, or organise in public. The former world chess 
champion Gary Kasparov was one of dozens to be arrested by riot police when he 
took part in an anti-Kremlin protest rally in Moscow on 24 November, his speech 
interrupted by a ‘screeching noise from loudspeakers on top of a nearby building’.44 
In St Petersburg the following day ‘scores of demonstrators were detained and some 
beaten . . . as riot police broke up a protest over the Kremlin’s lurch towards 
authoritarianism’; nearly 200 were arrested, among them Boris Nemtsov.45 
Opposition leaders, including Kasparov, were repeatedly harassed by pro-Kremlin 
youth in the run-up to the vote: stalked by activists, their news conferences disrupted, 
and recordings of loud, maniacal music played at their public meetings. One pro-
Kremlin activist handcuffed himself three times to Kasparov’s car; Boris Nemtsov 
was pelted with condoms.46 Kasparov spoiled his ballot paper on 2 December, and 
urged his supporters to do likewise; in his view it had been the ‘most unfair and 
dirtiest [election] in the whole history of modern Russia’.47 
The turnout and the results 
 
In the event, on the evidence of our post-election survey, most Russians thought the 
election had been reasonably fair.48 A substantial 63% thought it had been largely or 
entirely fair; just 14% said they thought it had been ‘mostly not free and fair’, and 
only 4% thought it had been ‘not free and fair at all’. Similarly, just over 1% reported 
that their vote had been influenced by outside pressures, and 7% that attempts had 
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47 Guardian, 4 December 2007, p. 2. 
48 Our survey was conducted under the auspices of Russian Research between 30 January and 27 
February 2008 (N=2,000), and is representative of the over-18 population of the Russian Federation. 
 
been made to influence them; but 78% reported no pressure whatsoever. Majorities, 
although less decisive ones, thought the formatting and counting of the ballot papers 
had been largely or entirely fair (61% agreed, 25% disagreed), and that television 
coverage of the election had been largely or entirely fair (59% agreed, 28% 
disagreed). Predictably, it was a verdict that differed considerably across supporters of 
the various parties. As many as 27% of those who voted for United Russia, for 
instance, thought the election had been ‘entirely free and fair’, as compared with 17% 
across all the parties and just 10% of those who had voted for the Communist Party or 
Just Russia. Popular perceptions of the fairness of the election, in other words, were at 
least partly a consequence of whether one’s own preferred party had done well.49 
Given the choice on offer, which was broadly speaking for or against the Russian 
president and his ‘plan’, there was a heavy emphasis on raising turnout from the 
levels of earlier years in order to provide a clear mandate for the winners and an 
advantageous starting-point for the Kremlin’s favoured candidate in the presidential 
contest three months later. For this and other reasons, the 2007 election showed a 
return to the levels of turnout that had been normal in earlier post-communist years 
(see Table 1).  
 
TABLE 1 
RUSSIAN DUMA ELECTIONS, 1993–2007 
 
Turnout (%)bDate PL 
seatsa
SMC 
seats 
 
% PL 
threshold 
 
PL 
contenders 
PL 
winners 
 ‘Voted’ ‘Took part’ 
12 Dec 1993 225 225 5 13 8 n.d. 54.81c
17 Dec 1995 225 225 5 43 4 64.38 64.73 
19 Dec 1999 225 225 5 26 6 61.69 61.85 
7 Dec 2003 225 225 5 23 3 55.67 55.75 
2 Dec 2007 450 [none] 7 11 4 63.71 [63.78] 
Notes: a Although conventionally described as ‘parties’, successive election laws in fact defined those 
eligible to nominate national lists of candidates as ‘electoral associations’ (including but not limited to 
parties) and ‘electoral blocs’ (1993), ‘associations’ and ‘blocs’ but without any explicit reference to 
parties (1995), ‘electoral associations’ including but not limited to parties (1999), and ‘electoral blocs’ 
as well as ‘political parties’ (2003). The election law that applied in 2007 was the first that gave the 
exclusive right to nominate a national list of candidates to ‘parties’ and was accordingly the first 
strictly defined ‘party-list’ election. 
b Turnout shows respectively those who ‘took part in the voting’ as a percentage of the registered 
electorate, and the percentage who ‘took part in the election’ by receiving ballot papers (which was the 
formal criterion for establishing the validity of an election until the law was amended in April 2007 and 
the turnout requirement was removed; thereafter official returns reported only the number who had 
actually cast ballots). In both cases, until 2007, slightly different numbers took part in the single-
member constituency and partylist elections (in 2003, for instance, 55.3% of the registered electorate 
cast ballots in the single-member constituencies, but 55.7% in the party-list contest); the totals reported 
are for the party-list contest in every case. In 2007 voting was only by party list so there was no 
divergence. 
c See Vybory (1996, p. 52). 
 
49 A similar question about the fairness of the 2003 election is not directly comparable, as it used a five-
point scale. However, in that survey 17% gave the highest level of fairness, 29% the second level, and 
34% the intermediate category. The results suggest broadly comparable levels of perceptions about 
fairness between the 2003 and 2007 surveys (we intend to return to the question of the ‘freeness and 
fairness’ of Russian elections more systematically in future publications). 
 
PL=party list; SMC=single-member constituency. 
Source: Official communiques of the Central Electoral Commission, including subsequent revisions. 
 
The options available in 2007 were less numerous than they had been in earlier 
elections, with no single-member constituency contests and no opportunity to vote 
‘against all’. Up to this point, those who wished to register their protest could do so by 
voting; in 2007, the only opportunity to do so was by spoiling the ballot paper (just 
over 1% did so, fewer than in 2003), or not voting at all. In other words, changes in 
the ballot-paper options should if anything have lowered, rather than increased the 
turnout. Nor had there been any increase in levels of interest in politics generally (on 
our evidence, a slight decline); and reported levels of campaign exposure were similar 
in both elections.50 In fact, the rise in turnout appears largely to be explained by the 
appeal of United Russia to many of those who had abstained or voted ‘against all’ in 
2003, and who might otherwise have abstained in 2007.51 
The election itself showed a big swing towards United Russia, allowing party leader 
Gryzlov to claim that Putin had ‘won on the first round’.52 Putin himself expressed 
satisfaction not simply with the turnout and the confidence that had evidently been 
placed in his own list of candidates, but with an outcome that would increase the 
legitimacy of the Duma itself in that the parties that had won representation accounted 
for 90% of the popular vote, rather than the previous 70%.53 According to the final 
tally (Table 2), United Russia had won almost two of every three votes cast, which 
meant a very substantial increase in its share of the total ballot and almost twice as 
many individual votes as it had secured in 2003. Only three other parties exceeded the 
7% threshold, and indeed no more would have done so if the threshold had remained 
at its earlier level. The Communist Party took just under 12%, slightly down on its 
2003 support but a result that maintained its position as the most obvious alternative 
to an otherwise entirely dominant United Russia; the party was also the second largest 
in the new Duma. The Liberal Democrats were down more substantially on their 2003 
result, and Just Russia was down on the 9% that its main constituent, Rodina, had won 
four years earlier. 
 Clearly, then, United Russia was able to persuade many to support it who had 
previously given their support to other parties. But which parties particularly? Table 3 
shows the flow of the vote between the 2003 and 2007 elections, based on a recall 
question in the survey.54 
50 In 2003, 44% said they were ‘very interested’ or ‘somewhat interested’ in politics, as compared with 
38% in 2007. Similarly, in 2003, 82% reported receiving promotional materials from the parties, 
compared to 77% in 2007; 42% had been canvassed at their home in 2003, and 43% in 2007. Levels of 
party activity, in other words, were very similar in the two elections. 
51 One other source of the increase in turnout was the greater use of mobile ballot boxes: 4.6 million 
voted in this way in 2007, compared with 3.4 million in 2003 (these votes were themselves more open 
to improper influence); and twice as many voted on the basis of absentee certificates (1.2 million, as 
compared with 572,965 in 2003). Twice as many voted in advance of polling day, but this was still a 
very small proportion of the total (just 147,966 votes in 2007). 
52 Izvestiya, 3 December 2007, p. 2. 
53 Izvestiya, 4 December 2007, p. 3. 
54 There is, of course, a substantial literature showing the perils of vote recall (for a review see Wright 
1993), with respondents typically overestimating their support for the winning party. This bias should 
be borne in mind when interpreting the results in Table 3, although the broad patterns we identify 
should hold true. 
 
TABLE 2 
THE DUMA ELECTION RESULT, 2 DECEMBER 2007 
 
Share of 
vote (%) 
Change 
2003–2007 
Number 
of seats 
Change 
2003–2007 
United Russia 64.30 (+26.74) 315 (+92) 
Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation 
11.57 (-1.04) 57 (+5) 
Liberal-Democratic 
Party of Russia 
8.14 (-3.31) 40 (+4) 
Just Russia: Rodina/ 
Pensioners/Life 
7.74 - 38  
[7% threshold]     
Agrarian Party of Russia 2.30    
Yabloko 1.59 (-2.71)  (-4) 
Civic Force 1.05    
Union of Right Forces 0.96 (-3.01)  (-3) 
Patriots of Russia 0.89    
Party of Social Justice 0.22    
Democratic Party 
of Russia 
0.13    
Invalid votes 1.09 (-0.47)   
Total 100  450  
Notes: The registered electorate was 109,145,517, of whom 69,537,065 cast a valid or invalid ballot 
(63.71%). The share of the vote in 2007 is compared with the 2003 party-list (but not single-member 
constituency) vote, and the number of seats with the seats won in both the party-list and single-member 
constituency contests in the earlier election. 
Sources: Adapted from the Central Electoral Commission communique´ published in Vestnik 
Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 19, 222, 2007, pp. 5–22, and the corrected 
results of the 2003 election that appeared in Vestnik Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, 8, 2005, pp. 215–19. 
 
It was clear, first of all, that United Russia had been the most effective of the parties 
in retaining its core vote: indeed nearly nine of every 10 United Russia voters in 2003 
had also voted for the party in 2007. By contrast, the Communist Party and the 
Liberal Democrats retained just two out of every three of their 2003 supporters, and 
Just Russia not much more than one out of every three that had supported Rodina in 
the earlier contest. For both the Communists and the Liberal Democrats, 14% of their 
2003 supporters defected to United Russia, although a similar number also decided to 
abstain, suggesting a measure of ambiguity in their preferences. United Russia was 
also able to attract the support of significant minorities of voters who had either 
abstained in 2003 or voted ‘against all’. In addition, it attracted a disproportionate 
level of support among new voters: of those doing so for the first time in 2007, 77% 
voted for United Russia but just 6% for the Communists, 12% for the Liberal 
Democrats and 2% for Just Russia. 
 
Explaining the results 
 
How do we explain the outcome of the 2007 Duma election and, in particular, the 
high level of support for United Russia? If the comparative literature is any guide, we 
might expect one of the main reasons to be the strong performance of the economy in 
the period leading up to the election, and its positive effects on support for the 
Kremlin and its favoured party. For most of the 1990s the Russian economy 
languished, reaching its nadir in the financial crisis of August 1998 when the 
government defaulted on its ruble bonds and the currency lost much of its exchange 
value. Since 1999, the economy has grown by a minimum of 5% a year, and in most 
years the level of growth has been significantly higher than this (in 2007 itself it was 
more than 8%). 
 
TABLE 3 
THE TURNOVER OF THE DUMA VOTE, 2003–2007 
 
2003 Vote 
United 
Russia 
CPRF Lib Dem Rodina 
 
Other 
party 
Against 
all 
Non-voter 
 
2007 Vote        
United   
Russia 
89 14 14 30 37 40 33 
 CPRF <1 64 4 7 9 5 3 
 Lib Dem 1 3 67 2 2 10 4 
Just Russia 3 3 1 37 7 10 3 
Other party 1 2 1 17 37 2 2 
Non-voter 5 14 13 8 8 33 55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (511) (202) (60) (60) (98) (40) (433) 
Notes: Figures are for all respondents; those too young to vote in 2003 are included under non-voters. 
The questions were: ‘Tell me, please, for which party you voted in the elections to the State Duma’
(showing a card); similarly for ‘the elections to the State Duma in December 2003’. 
Source: authors’ post-election survey (N=2,000), fielded between 30 January and 27 February 2008. 
 
More recently, there has been a substantial increase in capital investment, particularly 
in the construction industry. Notwithstanding the problems of insider buyout, weak 
corporate governance and widespread corruption, these macroeconomic changes have 
produced considerable prosperity for ordinary Russians, who now enjoy higher levels 
of disposable income than ever before and the lowest rates of unemployment recorded 
since the collapse of communism. 
 The impact of economic conditions on electoral outcomes is one of the most 
intensively researched areas of political science (Lewis-Beck & Stagmaier 2000). 
While the findings differ between countries, two conclusions consistently emerge. 
First, there is a distinction between how voters view their own (egocentric) economic 
situation, and how they evaluate the country’s (sociotropic) economy. In general, 
sociotropic evaluations exert more influence on voting than egocentric ones (Kinder 
& Kiewiet 1979). And secondly, countries that have clear lines of accountability to a 
single party in government have also been shown to exhibit higher levels of economic 
voting than countries that have coalition arrangements, where it is more difficult to 
assign blame or credit for economic performance (Lewis-Beck 1988). This 
observation is also supported in the post-communist context by Tucker’s comparative 
study (2006; Colton 1996), which found that the impact of the economy was greatest   
in countries in which the lines of accountability were clearest.  
 We set out our evidence of the public view of economic conditions in Figure 2. In 
2000, when Putin took office, negative assessments of national economic performance 
vastly outnumbered positive ones; for example, in January 2000, just 2% thought the 
Russian economy was performing well compared with 70% who thought it was 
performing badly, thus producing an index of 768. That negative perception has 
 
Figures show the percentage saying the economy is ‘very good’ or good’ minus the percentage saying 
‘bad’ or ‘very bad’. 
Sources: The figures for January 1995–January 2007 are derived from Vestnik obshchestvennogo 
mneniya, 1,87, January–February 2007, and for January - November 2007 from Vestnik 
obshchestvennogo mneniya, 6, 92, November–December 2007. 
 
FIGURE 2. TRENDS IN PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
 
steadily diminished over the two terms of the Putin presidency, and while by late 
2007 more people were still pessimistic than optimistic, the gap had narrowed to just 
715 points for the economy as a whole and718 points for the family economy. For 
most of the period, the national economy was evaluated more negatively than the 
family economy, but by 2007 the differences were negligible. The improvement in 
both indices, moreover, was relatively consistent, apart from 2005, when the 
government’s wage payments to state employees went into arrears because of 
problems with the budget deficit, and after an attempt to convert social benefits into 
their monetary equivalent at the start of the year led to open protests across the 
country, particularly by pensioners. 
 The clear lines of accountability from the economy to Putin and United Russia, on 
this basis, coupled with the very significant improvement in public perceptions of 
economic performance, should have enhanced Putin’s own approval ratings and also 
those of the party that has defined itself by its support for the president and his 
policies. Table 4 shows that this is indeed the case. Among United Russia voters, for 
instance, 60% said they believed the country’s economy had improved over the 
previous 12 months; fewer were satisfied with their own personal economic 
circumstances, but as we have already noted, it is sociotropic rather than egocentric 
 
TABLE 4 
THE ECONOMY AND THE VOTE 
 
2007 Vote 2003 2007 
United 
Russia 
CPRF Lib Dem Just Russia 
Country economy past 12 months 
Better 40 47 60 23 36 37 
Same 44 34 30 37 41 43 
Worse 16 19 10 40 23 20 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (1,921) (1,335) (898) (161) (104) (84) 
Satisfaction with things in country 
Satisfied 21 34 45 13 19 21 
Neither 33 32 34 24 27 27 
Unsatisfied 46 34 21 63 44 52 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (1,926) (1,335) (898) (161) (104) (84) 
Family economy past 12 months 
Better 24 31 39 12 22 25 
Same 52 42 42 40 43 44 
Worse 24 27 19 48 35 41 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (1,985) (1,389) (939) (167) (106) (87) 
Notes: Question wordings were: ‘What do you think of the state of the economy in Russia today? 
Would you say that the condition of the economy is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very 
bad?’; ‘Would you say that the state of the economy in Russia in the past 12 months has improved, 
stayed the same or deteriorated?’; ‘Tell me please, in the last 12 months has the material position of 
your family worsened, stayed the same or improved? 
Source: As Table 3. 
 
judgments that are the most pertinent to electoral outcomes. Supporters of the other 
parties were much less positive about the country’s economy: Communist voters, for 
example, were much more likely to say that the country’s economy had performed 
badly over the previous 12 months and nearly half thought their family economy had 
become worse over the same period. Evidently, positive views about the country’s 
economic performance and its association with Putin had a very significant impact on 
the United Russia vote; just how significant we will quantify later. 
 For Putin himself, the steadily improving economy was obviously a major part of his 
appeal to voters. But he was also seen as a decisive leader who was prepared to stand 
up to Western powers, notably over the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He also improved his 
position among the public by imprisoning or driving into exile several of the oligarchs 
who had become very rich in the Yel’tsin era. Putin’s approval ratings have been high 
by any standards, as Figure 3 demonstrates. For most leaders, the only trend in their 
popular approval once they are elected is down, and the only variable is how rapid 
that decline in public support is. Putin represents an altogether different phenomenon: 
in January 2001 his approval rating was 76%, but by December 2007, after nearly 
seven years in office, his rating had actually improved to 87%, an almost 
unprecedented situation for a leader in any peacetime democracy. The only slight 
 
Annual figures from January each year. 
Source: Adapted from http://www.russiavotes.org/president/putin_performance_trends.php, accessed 
19 April 2008. 
 
FIGURE 3. EVALUATIONS OF PUTIN’S PERFORMANCE AS PRESIDENT 
 
decline in his approval rating occurred in 2005 when, as we saw in Figure 2, wage 
arrears and the monetisation of social benefits produced a temporary dip in the 
increasing optimism about the national economy. By early 2007 that decline was 
behind him, and he had returned to the ‘Turkmenian’ ratings of the early 2000s. 
 How far did the ‘Putin effect’ benefit United Russia and, by implication, damage the 
other parties? Table 5 suggests that the benefits were considerable. Most strikingly of 
all, no fewer than 96% of United Russia voters approved of Putin’s overall 
performance; but even among the opposition parties a majority approved of him— 
among Communist voters, almost two-thirds approved of his performance, increasing 
to 87% among voters for Just Russia. One of Putin’s selling points was that he 
represented the strong leader that many Russians had thought they needed during the 
painful economic transition of the 1990s, at a time when the country had actually been 
in the charge of an elderly man of uncertain health and eccentric behaviour. United 
Russia appears to have drawn no particular benefit from Putin’s strong personal 
authority: Table 5 shows that party differences on the view that a ‘strong leader is 
better than any laws’ were marginal, and indeed Communist voters were more likely 
to endorse this view than their United Russia counterparts. The Putin effect, therefore, 
would seem to be less closely connected with his leadership style than with the 
tangible economic achievements with which it was associated. We return to this 
interpretation below. 
 The third possible explanation for the strong support for United Russia in the 2007 
election was that Western-style democratic principles were at last beginning to gain 
widespread popular acceptance in Russia. The early post-communist years had been 
marked by nostalgia for the authoritarian past, particularly during the move towards a 
market economy by means of ‘shock therapy’ in which the price of staple foods had 
Annual figures from January each year. 
TABLE 5 
THE ‘PUTIN EFFECT’ AND THE VOTE 
 
2007 Vote 2003 2007 
United 
Russia 
CPRF Lib Dem Just Russia 
Strong leader better than laws 
Agree 40 37 40 50 43 38 
Neither 33 35 35 22 31 35 
Disagree 27 28 25 18 26 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (1,857) (1,882) (895) (158) (102) (86) 
View of Putin 
Approve 90 86 96 63 69 87 
Disapprove 10 14 4 37 31 13 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (1,953) (1,948) (932) (161) (106) (87) 
Notes: Question wordings were: ‘Tell me please, to what extent do you agree with the view that a 
strong, powerful leader can do more for our country than any laws? [Completely disagree, somewhat 
disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, entirely agree]’; ‘Tell me please, on the whole do 
you approve or disapprove of the activity of V. V. Putin as President of Russia? [Completely approve, 
partially approve, partially disapprove, complete disapprove]’. 
Source: As Table 3. 
 
risen dramatically. Putin appeared to represent a successful transition to a stable and 
deliberately ‘Russian’ form of democracy that had considerable attraction for ordinary 
voters after the confusion and lawlessness of the Yel’tsin years. No longer was the 
state falling apart; taxes were being collected, pensions were being paid and the law 
was being enforced, sometimes with exemplary severity. At the same time, living 
standards were steadily rising. While there were concerns about Putin’s apparently 
weak commitment to media freedom and human rights, these were very much 
minority issues. And his independent foreign policy and willingness to use 
Russia’s energy reserves to improve its international standing further enhanced his 
appeal (Rose & Munro 2002, pp. 218ff). 
 To what extent did United Russia benefit from the popular belief that Russia under 
Putin’s leadership had at last become a stable democracy? The 2003 and 2007 surveys 
both address this question. For instance, respondents were asked several questions 
about their preferred political system (see Table 6). When asked to choose between 
four alternative systems, a plurality of respondents in the 2007 survey opted for the 
‘political system today’ as their preferred option, followed by ‘the Soviet system but 
in a different, more democratic form’. No more than one in five wanted a return to the 
Soviet system, and just one in 10 chose ‘democracy in its Western form’. A majority 
of respondents, accordingly, favoured some form of democracy, although they were 
divided between the current system and one of a more Soviet kind. However, when 
we compare these results with those for 2003, there are two significant changes. First, 
significantly fewer respondents preferred the Soviet system in 2007 than in 2003—
20% compared with 35% in 2003. And secondly, there was a large shift in favour of a 
‘Soviet system but in a different, more democratic form’; just 7% supported this 
 
TABLE 6 
POLITICAL SYSTEM PREFERENCES AND THE VOTE 
 
2007 Vote 2003 2007 
United 
Russia 
CPRF Lib Dem Just 
Russia 
Best political system 
Soviet system 35 20 13 47 26 20 
Soviet, more democracy 7 31 28 44 33 44 
Political system today 40 36 48 7 18 17 
Democracy as in West 18 13 11 2 23 19 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (1,557) (1,711) (932) (161) (106) (87) 
Democracy better than alternatives 
Agree 71 76 82 50 33 81 
Disagree 29 24 18 50 67 19 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (1,664) (1,681) (819) (134) (95) (79) 
Notes: Question wordings were: ‘Which of the following political systems would be the most 
appropriate for Russia? The Soviet system that we had in our country before perestroika; the Soviet 
system but in a different, more democratic form; the political system that presently exists; democracy 
of the Western kind’; ‘Tell me please, do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
‘‘Democracy may have its faults, but it is better than any other form of government’’. Do you agree 
completely, agree, disagree or completely disagree with this statement?’ The estimates for the latter 
question in 2003 come from a 2005 survey. 
Source: as Table 3. 
 
option in 2003, but 31% did so in 2007. Overall, though the evidence is hardly 
unequivocal, there has been some movement from a Soviet-type system to one that 
incorporates at least a number of more democratic features.  
 United Russia, moreover, has benefited from these changes in public opinion. In 
2007, almost half the party’s supporters preferred ‘the political system that exists 
today’, compared to just 18% of Liberal Democrat voters and only 7%of Communist 
voters. Communist voters, not surprisingly, were the most likely to support a return to 
the Soviet system (47%). United Russia voters were also the most supportive of the 
view that democracy was better than the other alternatives: 82% supported this view, 
followed by 81% of Just Russia voters and just 33% of Liberal Democrat voters. The 
evidence, in other words, also offers support for the view that there has not simply 
been a shift in favour of a more ‘democratic’ system, but also that this shift of opinion 
has been associated with the rise of United Russia, with a causality that is likely to 
operate in both directions. 
 We have, accordingly, three possible explanations for the strong public support for 
United Russia in the 2007 Duma election, each of which receives some level of 
support in the bivariate analyses presented above: economic performance; positive 
evaluations of Putin in particular; and a personal commitment to a more democratic 
political system, with the Soviet system being at one extreme, a Western system at the 
other.55 Which of these explanations is the most persuasive? To make this evaluation 
we estimate a multinominal logistic regression (MNL) model that compares the voters 
from each party with one another; the results are shown in Table 7. MNL is 
appropriate where a dependent variable has more than two categories, and enables a 
 
55 The variable is scored on an ordinal scale, with the Soviet system=1, a more democratic Soviet 
system=2, the political system as it is today=3, and democracy as in West=4. The variable therefore 
represents the degree of support for democracy. 
more complex statistical model to be estimated; it is especially helpful in the analysis 
of voting in a multiparty system, as in Russia.56 For ease of interpretation, the 
analyses are limited here to the four parties that cleared the threshold and won 
representation in the 2007 election: United Russia, the Communist Party, the Liberal 
Democrats and Just Russia. 
 The results in Table 7 show all the sets of contrasts between voters for the four 
parties; our interest is in the contrasts involving United Russia voters, which cover the 
first three equations in the table. These three equations show the strong effect of 
approval of Putin’s performance in distinguishing United Russia voters from voters of 
the other three parties. By contrast, the notion of a strong leader is not a significant 
influence in any of the six equations. Next in importance is economic performance, 
with optimists being more likely to vote for United Russia than either of the other 
three parties, net of other circumstances. As theories of economic voting predict, it is 
sociotropic evaluations of economic performance that are more important than 
egocentric ones; indeed, evaluations of the family economy are not statistically 
significant in any of the three equations. And third, there is a significant effect for 
believing that democracy is better than the Soviet system, but only in distinguishing 
United Russia from Communist voters, not from Liberal Democrat or Just Russia 
supporters. There is no effect for believing that democracy is a better system than the 
alternatives, again net of other circumstances. 
 The findings underline the impact of Putin individually in shaping support for the 
United Russia party list. However, as already noted, much of this positive view of 
Putin’s performance is related to a positive assessment of the national economy. This 
hypothesis is supported by the survey data, and when the equations in Table 7 were 
re-estimated but leaving out approval of Putin’s performance, the effect of the 
economy—via the public’s evaluations of the country’s economy over the past 12 
months—was of considerably greater importance. In other words, much of the impact 
of Putin on party support is a consequence of strong growth in the economy, and 
voters’ assigning credit for that growth to Putin. It has less to do with Putin’s style of 
leadership, or with his support for representative democracy. This conclusion is 
underlined by the strong correlation between a positive view of the national economy 
and approval of Putin (r¼0.379, p_0.000); by contrast, the correlation between 
approval of Putin and support for a strong leader is not statistically significant 
(r¼0.025, p¼0.388). Putin’s popular appeal, in other words, has been substantially 
based on strong economic performance, and it is that which has underpinned the 
widespread popular support for the party with which he is identified. 
 
56 See Whitten and Palmer (1996). Strictly speaking, multinomial probit is a more appropriate method 
for analysing voting behaviour, but it is less easy to interpret and calculate and for that reason, MNL is 
used here. 
 
TABLE 7 
PREDICTING THE 2007 PARTY VOTE (MNL ESTIMATES) 
 
(Parameter estimates and standard errors) 
United vs 
CPRF 
United vs 
Lib Dem 
United vs 
Fair 
CPRF vs 
Lib Dem 
CPRF vs 
Fair 
Lib Dem vs 
Fair 
Economic performance 
Economy 
better 
past 12 
months 
0.36* (0.17) 0.05 
(0.18) 
0.41* (0.19) -0.31 (0.21) 0.06 (0.22) 0.36 (0.23) 
Family 
economy 
better 
past 12 
months 
 
0.21 (0.16) 0.11 
(0.17) 
0.14 (0.19) -0.09 (0.20) -0.07 (0.22) 0.02 (0.23) 
Satisfied 
with things 
in country 
 
0.42** (0.13) 0.56** 
(0.14) 
0.50* (0.16) 0.14 (0.17) 0.08 (0.19) -0.06 (0.19) 
The Putin effect 
Strong 
leader 
better than 
laws 
 
-0.06 (0.10) -0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.04 (0.11) 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.14) 
Approve of 
Putin 
1.12** (0.15) 1.03** 
(0.16) 
0.63* (0.18) -0.09 (0.18) -0.48** 
(0.20) 
-0.40** 
(0.21) 
Political system 
Democracy 
better 
than Soviet 
0.93** (0.16) 0.04 
(0.15) 
0.07 (0.16) -0.88** 
(0.20) 
-0.85** 
(0.21) 
0.03 (0.20) 
Democracy 
better 
than others 
-0.07 (0.17) -1.03 
(0.18) 
-0.22 (0.21) 0.04 (0.20) -0.15 (0.23) -0.19 (0.25) 
Constant -6.31  -3.34 -2.49 2.97 3.82 0.85 
Nagelkerke 
R-Sq 
0.35      
(N) (1,306)      
Notes: *Statistically significant at p<0.01, two-tailed. Multinominal logistic regression showing 
parameter estimates and standard errors predicting six sets of contrasts between party voters. 
Source: As Table 3. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It was in many ways appropriate that a party in whose foundation Putin indicated he 
had played a very direct role was a party that owed its electoral success to that 
association. Putin, indeed, had ‘won on the first round’: he led United Russia’s party 
list, its programme was ‘Putin’s Plan’, it presented the election itself as a 
‘referendum’ on the president and his record of government. On our evidence, it was 
less Putin as an individual or a political leader that had helped United Russia to its 
victory: it was his association with a rapid improvement in living standards. Putin 
himself, during the campaign, had indicated his dissatisfaction with the party: as we 
have seen, he deplored its lack of ideological principle, and the way in which it had 
become a vehicle for ambitious officials at all levels. But the Kremlin needed an 
obedient instrument through which it could control the legislative process, and a result 
that would provide a launching pad for its chosen presidential contender. It was able 
to achieve both of these objectives. 
 All the same, the vote in conjunction with the turnout meant that United Russia had 
gained the support of not much more than 40% of the entire electorate. In the two 
capitals, Moscow and St Petersburg, not much more than 50% had taken part and the 
United Russia list took no more than 54.2 and 50.3% of the vote, respectively; this 
meant that United Russia had taken not much more than a quarter of the electorate in 
the president’s own home town, or in the nation’s capital. In the distant Nenets 
autonomous district, support for United Russia was lower still, at 48.8%. All of this 
left the United Russia vote well below the vote that Putin had personally attained in 
the 2004 presidential contest, and it was—some suggested—the reason he had failed 
to make a personal appearance at the United Russia headquarters on the night 
following the vote, an ‘unprecedented’ absence.57 Leading officials in the regions that 
had reported a below-average turnout, or whose electors had fallen behind others in 
their support for the Kremlin party, were expected to examine their positions and 
some were likely to face dismissal.58 But it was certainly a result that would be 
sufficient for the Kremlin’s immediate purposes. 
 In a larger sense, the result had both positive and negative implications for the 
Russian leadership. On our evidence, there were relatively few who thought the result 
was other than a genuine reflection of the wishes of the electorate. And there was no 
reason to be surprised that a strong record of economic performance should have 
delivered a convincing victory for the party that was associated with its achievement. 
Or at least, for the party whose leading candidate was associated with its achievement. 
At the same time, there was little evidence that United Russia had established an 
identity that would allow it to appeal for popular support whatever the success of the 
policies with which it was associated; it would be successful as long as the economy 
continued to advance, but no longer. In this sense, its future was not very different 
from that of the president and the ‘plan’ that had just been endorsed by the Russian 
electorate. If economic growth began to falter, both United Russia and its leading 
candidate might find they could draw on very shallow reserves of loyalty.  
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